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MEDICARE: THE PERPETUAL BALANCE
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND PRESERVATION
Craig B. Garner*
“Confusion is a word we have invented for an order which is not
understood.”1
Passed by Congress and signed by President Lyndon Johnson into law in
1965, Medicare2 has weathered storms from all directions, growing to be the
preeminent standard for health insurance in the United States.3 The idea of
losing Medicare as a vital public benefit still remains the single greatest fear
with which each passing generation of Americans must contend, and yet,
these challenges over the past fifty years, designed to fortify Medicare’s
foundation and ensure its longevity, continue to take a toll on the program.4
The most recent climate of reform includes changes implemented by the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).5 The PPACA is
designed to expand coverage for a broader group of people, yet it adds
unprecedented layers of complexity such that it may be but a matter of time
before the confusion experienced by today’s providers proves to be

	
  
* Craig B. Garner is an attorney and health care consultant, specializing in issues
surrounding modern American healthcare and the ways in which it should be managed in
its current climate of reform. Mr. Garner’s law practice focuses on healthcare mergers
and acquisitions, regulatory compliance, and counseling for providers in all
matters pertaining to contemporary healthcare in the United States. Mr. Garner is also an
adjunct professor of law at Pepperdine University School of Law, where he teaches
courses on Hospital Law and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
1. HENRY MILLER, TROPIC OF CAPRICORN 176 (Grove Press, Inc. 1961).
2. Originally Title 18 of the Social Security Act.
3. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 30 (Mar. 2014), available at http://medpac.gov/
documents/Mar14_EntireReport.pdf (“Because of its size and because other payers use
its payment methods, Medicare has an important influence on the nation’s health care
delivery system and its evolution.”). The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(“MedPAC”) is an independent congressional agency established by the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-6).
4. Seniors Fear Hit to Medicare, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/01/seniors-worry-health-care-law-willhurt-them/.
5. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
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Medicare’s undoing altogether. The decades of trial and error upon which
health care in the United States have been built, at least from the point of
view of both physicians and lawmakers who watch from the sidelines, may
give way to confusion and disruption industry-wide as a result of newly
enacted regulations.6
Today, Medicare is the preeminent standard for health insurance in the
United States, expanding despite fluctuations in the economic, political and
social climate since its initial passage. However, in its struggle toward
sustainability, the Medicare Program must understand the resulting
consequences as it distances itself further and further from its original
simplicity in 1965.7
Medicare’s original cost-based system gave way in the 1980s to the
Prospective Payment System (“PPS”),8 an event noted by many with great
concern.9 Under PPACA, the Medicare system takes another monumental
step as it incorporates elements of performance into the PPS.10 Formulaic
and confusing, Medicare’s recent approach to provider reimbursement has
been likened to Finnegan’s Wake by James Joyce,11 a book that some critics

	
  
6. Compare Herrymon Mauer, The M.D.’s Are Off Their Pedestal, FORTUNE MAG.
138, Feb. 1954, with Kevin Vachon, Confused and Disengaged About Health Care,
PORTLAND DAILY SUN (May 15, 2013, 4:04 PM), http://www.portlanddailysun.me
/index.php/opinion/columns/9355-confused-and-disengaged-about-health-care.
7. In Medicare’s early years, “unrestricted cost reimbursement became the modus
operandi for financial American medical care.” Rick Mayes, The Origins, Development,
and Passage of Medicare’s Revolutionary Prospective Payment System, 62 J. HIST. MED.
& ALLIED SCI. 21, 24 (2007). According to Sheila Burke, Chief of Staff of Former
Senator Robert Dole: “Medicare’s traditional model of cost reimbursement was insanity.
On the face of it, it encouraged people to do more; it paid them to do more and not in any
particularly rational way.” Id. at 22 (emphasis in original).
8. First, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (“TEFRA”) directed the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop a proposal for legislation that would
provide for reimbursement “on a prospective basis.” Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 101(c), 96
Stat. 324, 335 (1982). The following year, Congress created the “Prospective Payment
System” (“PPS”), which hospitals first became subject to on October 1, 1983, and was
phased in over a period of four years. Alvarado Cnty. Hosp. v. Shalala, 155 F.3d 1115,
1119 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
9. See, e.g., Ross Mullner & David McNeil, Rural and Urban Hospital Closures: A
Comparison, 56 HEALTH AFFAIRS 131 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Matthew J. Press, Limits of Readmission Rates in Measuring Hospital
Quality Suggest the Need for Added Metrics, 6 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1083 (June 2013).
11. See, e.g., Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 841 F. Supp. 2d 270,
270, 270 n.1 (D.D.C. 2012), rev’d by 718 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (comparing James
Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake to the Medicare statute, and calling it “among the most
completely impenetrable texts within human experience.”) (quoting Rehab. Assn’ of Va.
v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994)).
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warn requires “skeleton keys” to understand.12 In many ways, the need for
hospitals and physicians to understand these performance-based measures
may seem less important when fear of Medicare insolvency looms in the
distance,13 especially as it relates to Medicare Part A (hospital insurance
benefits for inpatient services) and Medicare Part B (supplemental insurance
for outpatient services, among other things).14 Irrespective of the fleeting
grasp providers may have over PPACA’s new Medicare system, hospitals
and physicians alike are mindful that the PPS as they once knew it is gone,
replaced in part with the beginnings of a performance-based Medicare in
which they may lose precious revenue, one percentage point at a time.15
I. MEDICARE’S MODERN DAY STRUGGLE TO SUSTAIN GUARANTEED
HEALTH INSURANCE
In its initial form, Part A of the Medicare Act provided coverage for
inpatient hospital costs and other similar expenses to all persons 65 years of
age or older who could satisfy the legal residency requirements.16 Part B, on
the other hand, created a voluntary program for qualifying low-income

	
  
12. See, e.g., ELOISE KNOWLTON, JOYCE, JOYCEANS, AND THE RHETORIC OF CITATION
3 (The University Press of Florida 1998). One example from Finnegan’s Wake is the
word “bababadalgharaghtakamminarronnkonnbronntonnerronntuonnthunntrovarrhouna
wnskawntoohoohoordenenthurnuk!,” JAMES JOYCE, FINNEGAN’S WAKE 3 (The Viking
Press 1939), which critics note may mark the downfall of Adam and Eve. See Michael
Chabon, What to Make of Finnegan’s Wake? N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 12, 2012,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/what-make-finneganswake/?pagination=false.
13. See, e.g., MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, A DATA BOOK: HEALTH CARE
SPENDING & THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 8 (June 2012), http://www.medpac.gov/docume
nts/Jun12DataBookEntireReport.pdf (“Beginning in 2010, the aging of the baby-boom
generation, an expected increase in life expectancy, and the Medicare drug benefit are
likely to increase the proportion of economic resources devoted to Medicare.”).
14. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 698 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir.
2012).
15. See, e.g., id.
16. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 506 (1994)
(“Medicare is a federally funded health insurance program for the elderly and disabled.”).
Originally Title 18 of the Social Security Act, as amended by Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat.
286 (1965). When President Lyndon B. Johnson signed Medicare into law on July 30,
1965, he credited Harry S. Truman as the one who “planted the seeds of compassion and
duty” that resulted in Medicare. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of
the Medicare Bill (July 30, 1965) [hereinafter Johnson, Remarks at Signing], available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/anniversaries/medicarebill.htm.
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individuals to insure against costs from physician and other specific
outpatient services and supplies.17
After signing this historic act into law, President Johnson commented:
No longer will older Americans be denied the healing miracle of
modern medicine. No longer will illness crush and destroy the
savings that they have so carefully put away over a lifetime so that
they might enjoy dignity in their later years. No longer will young
families see their own incomes, and their own hopes, eaten away
simply because they are carrying out their deep moral obligations
to their parents, and to their uncles, and their aunts. And no longer
will this Nation refuse the hand of justice to those who have given
a lifetime of service and wisdom and labor to the progress of this
progressive country.18
The foundational coverage provided by Medicare’s Part A includes ninety
consecutive days (known as a “Benefit Period”), subject to certain
deductibles and obligations.19 Although there is no limit on the number of
Benefit Periods to which a Medicare beneficiary is entitled, as a general rule
there must be sixty consecutive days between any two Benefit Periods,
where the beneficiary does not receive any inpatient hospital or other
qualifying care under Medicare. 20
A. Negation, Disjunction, and Conjunction
With its nearly fifty-year history, Medicare’s evolution has been
surprisingly marginal in comparison to other public programs, while still
serving the health insurance needs for those sixty-five years of age or
older.21 Perhaps the most significant change occurred in the 1980s under the

	
  
17. See Title 42, Ch. 7 (Social Security), Subchapter XIX (Grants to States for
Medical Assistance Program).
18. Johnson, Remarks at Signing, (Jul. 30, 1965), supra note 16.
19. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GENERAL
INFORMATION, ELIGIBILITY, AND ENTITLEMENT [hereinafter “CMS MANUAL”], Ch. 3, §§
10.4,
10.4.1,
10.4.2,
10.4.3,
10.4.3.1,
10.4.4.
(Nov.
15,
2013),
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/downloads/
ge101c03.pdf.
20. Id. at Ch. 3, § 10.4.2.
21. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (expanding Medicare
eligibility to people under the age of 65 with certain long-term disabilities as well as
those with kidney disease); Health Maintenance Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-222,
87 Stat. 914 (1973) (creating a partnership of sorts between the Federal Government and
certain health care providers as they eased Medicare’s increasing burden); Emergency
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1986)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd) (requiring hospitals that receive federal funding to treat
any patient with an emergency condition in such a way that, upon the patient’s release,
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Reagan administration with the introduction of the PPS and DiagnosisRelated Groups (“DRGs”). 22 Restructuring the Medicare system by
reimbursing hospitals “at a fixed amount for each patient discharged
regardless of the costs incurred by the hospital,”23 DRGs to this day remain
at the center of the Medicare system.24
The changes recently introduced by PPACA reach Medicare’s core,
although implementation has just begun and will continue for decades to
come.25 PPS introduced the notion of efficiency to the Medicare system,
and with PPACA comes the era of performance. 26 With thirty years
separating the PPS and PPACA, each reform raised the threat of catastrophic
operating losses for hospitals unable to meet the demands to change. DRGs
have been generally successful in keeping hospitals within any fiscal
objectives, and, as an added benefit, DRGs have also shown their influence
in creating a hospital dynamic that forces physicians to align with these new
hospital efficiencies, lest the hospital be put in the position of having to
exclude physician participation whenever possible.27
Over time, however, DRGs have evolved to such an extent that their
current level of complexity may be seen as counterintuitive to their original

	
  
“no further deterioration of the condition is likely”); Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (creating a
national standard for electronic health care transactions and national identifiers for health
insurance plans, providers and employees); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (establishing the “Medicare Advantage” option for
beneficiaries sometimes referred to as “Part C” and previously known as “Medicare +
Choice”); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (creating “Part D” and also establishing in part a network
of Recovery Audit Contractors (“RACs”) to detect and correct improper payments within
Medicare); Deficit Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2005) (expanding
the RAC program to the state level through a Medicaid Integrity Program); Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH”), Pub. L. No.
111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (protecting patient confidentiality by expanding provider
liability under HIPAA).
22. Mark B. McClellan, Medicare Reimbursement and Hospital Cost Growth, in
ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 149 (David A. Wise ed. 1996); GAIL R.
WILENSKY, THE ECONOMICS OF DRG-BASED PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT (Cent. for
Health Affairs 1985).
23. Alvarado Cmty. Hosp., 155 F.3d at 1119.
24. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems
for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System
and Fiscal Year 2014 Rates, 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013).
25. See, e.g., id.
26. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 412.160.
27. See generally David M. Frankford, The Medicare DRGs: Efficiency and
Organizational Rationality, 10 YALE L. J. ON REG. 273 (1993).
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intent. By 2008, DRGs splintered into Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related
Groups (“MS-DRGs”), which focus on patients with similar clinical
conditions and correlating fixed reimbursements.28 Moreover, certain MSDRGs are linked to complications or comorbidities (“CCs”) as well as major
complications or comorbidities (“MCCs”), thereby transforming the
relatively simple 1982 system of 467 DRGs into a modern day labyrinth that
not only includes additional acronymic descriptors introduced in 2008,29
such as the applicable DRG “w/CC,” “w/o CC,” “w/MCC,” and “w/o
MCC,” but also a set of 2014 regulations that further define 1,622 MCCs
and 3,529 CCs.30 As each variation alters the expected reimbursement,
nearly any error in a patient’s hospital bill may result in a false claim, which
constitutes a criminal offense under federal law.31 At its core, the Federal

	
  
28. 42 C.F.R. § 412.4.
29. Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems and Fiscal Year
2008 Rates, 72 Fed. Reg. 47,130 (Aug. 22, 2007); but see Proposed Changes to the
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and Fiscal
Year 2010 Rates and to the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and
Rate Year 2010 Rates, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,080, 24,092 (May 22, 2009) (“We believe that
revisions to the DRG system to better recognize severity of illness and changes to the
relative weights based on costs rather than charges are improving the accuracy of
payment rates in the IPPS.”).
30. 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013). The proposed regulations for 2015 contain
similar DRG numbers. 79 Fed. Reg. 27,978 (May 15, 2014).
31. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care
Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 247 (2004) (“The abstract contours of fraud
and abuse principles must be translated into practical requirements to which health care
providers can adhere—and against which their compliance can be measured.”). The
primary body of law under which liability may arise in health care transactions is the
Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”). 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) states:
(1) [A]ny person who— (A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a
false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly makes,
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a
false or fraudulent claim; (C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph
(A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G); (D) has possession, custody, or control of
property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly
delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property; (E)
is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property
used, or to be used, by the Government and, intending to defraud the
Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that
the information on the receipt is true; (F) knowingly buys, or receives as a
pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee
of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not
sell or pledge property; or (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made
or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly
and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or
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False Claims Act (“FCA”) imposes liability on anyone who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment
or approval.”32
B. Codifying the Confusion
In its attempt to provide a more solid groundwork for American
healthcare, PPACA did what may have been previously considered
impossible by making Medicare reimbursements even more complicated,
escalating the process to a level where the system of guaranteed health
insurance can only be explained through algorithms. 33 Each year the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) publishes updated

	
  
property to the Government, is liable to the United States Government for a
civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 . . . plus 3
times the amount of damages.
32. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Over the years Congress passed many laws
focusing on fraud and abuse, including: Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (regulating Medicare provider fraud and abuse, as well
as over utilization and unnecessary referrals); Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977) (expanding the scope of
prohibited conduct under Medicare to include practically any remuneration for a
physician from the referral of a Medicare or Medicaid beneficiary); Civil Monetary
Penalties Law of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (authorizing the federal
government to assess fines as well as enforce program exclusions against providers who
submit false, fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate claims to Medicare or Medicaid);
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93,
101 Stat. 680 (1987) (enlisting the aid of the Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) to
regulate inappropriate provider arrangements); Ethics in Patient Referral Act of 1989,
Pub L. No. 101-239, 102 Stat. 2106 (commonly known as the first of three “Stark” laws,
Congress passed regulations directed at physician referrals for clinical services to an
entity in which the physician has a financial interest); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (Stark II) and the 2007
modifications to Stark II (informally known as Stark III); Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (expanding the reverse
false claim provision significantly so that it now prohibits “knowingly conceal[ing] or
knowingly and improperly avoid[ing] or decreas[ing] an obligation to pay” the United
States; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G); Section 6402 PPACA (establishing a new
requirement for “Reporting and Returning of Overpayments” within 60 days of
identifying the overpayment). Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and
Abuse; Revisions to the Office of Inspector General's Civil Monetary Penalty Rules, 79
Fed. Reg. 27,080 (May 12, 2014) (clarifying the OIG’s civil money penalty authority
from the PPACA).
33. See Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (noting that the statutory language for calculating a hospital’s Medicare
disproportionate patient percentage (“DPP”) “is downright byzantine and its meaning not
easily discernible”).
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regulations for the Medicare Program, and in particular the Inpatient
Prospective Payment Systems (“IPPS”) for Acute Care Hospitals. Effective
October 1 of each year (the start of the Federal Government’s fiscal year),
the IPPS regulations set forth in copious detail what hospitals can expect
from the Medicare Program in the forthcoming fiscal year. With the 2014
final rules weighing in at 546 triple-columned pages from the Federal
Register,34 these annual updates average about half the size of PPACA itself,
and address nearly everything a hospital needs to know about changes to the
Medicare program for the following year. 35
Some of the more intricate topics include the MS-DRG adjustments,36 the
Hospital Value Based Purchasing Program (“VBP”) (for fiscal years 2014
through 2019), 37 Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (“RRP”), 38
Hospital-Acquired Conditions (“HAC”) and Healthcare-Associated
Infections (“HAI”), 39 as well as a total reconfiguration of Medicare
Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DSH”) payments.40 These regulations
continue to cause “dread” for any Medicare enthusiast, “for not only are they
dense reading of the most tortuous kind, but Congress also revisits the area
frequently, generously cutting and pruning in the process and making any
solid grasp of the matters addressed merely a passing phase.”41 Indeed, poor

	
  
34. 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013). The proposed rules for 2015 are a mere
408 triple-columned pages in comparison. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective
Payment System and Proposed Fiscal Year 2015 Rates, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,979 (May 15,
2014).
35. CMS’s objective is to “transform Medicare from a passive payer of claims to an
active purchaser of quality [health care] for its beneficiaries.” Hospital Inpatient ValueBased Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 2,454-2,455 (Jan. 13, 2011).
36. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,506.
37. Id. at 50,677.
38. Id. at 50,653.
39. Id. at 50,523.
40. Id. at 50,613; see also Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp., 718 F.3d at 916.
41. Rehabilitation Ass’n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1449 (4th Cir. 1994).
An advanced degree in mathematics may also be useful in understanding Medicare. See,
e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,602.
In the FY 2010-based IPPS market basket, NAICS 55 expenses that were
subject to allocation based on the home office allocation methodology
represent 5.650 percent of the total operating costs. Based on the home office
results, we are apportioning 3.503 percentage points of the 5.650 percentage
points figure into the labor-related share and designating the remaining 2.147
percentage points as non labor-related. In sum, based on the two allocations
mentioned above, we apportioned 4.804 percentage points into the laborrelated share. This amount is added to the 0.696 percentage point of
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performance in 2014’s more complex topics could potentially force a
hospital out of business.42
C. The Hospital VBP
Well into its second year, the Hospital VBP Program is nothing short of
an epic restructuring of the Medicare Program, as it places performance
rather than costs at center stage for determining hospital reimbursements.43
On October 1, 2012, its first day in operation, the Hospital VBP Program
reduced hospital reimbursements by one percent across the board, thereby
creating a “bonus pool” for those successful in this new program, based
upon each individual hospital’s Total Performance Score (“TPS”).44 This
initial reduction increases each year, and is presently capped at two percent
for 2017.45
Calculation of a hospital’s TPS includes determining performance in
addressing specific clinical conditions or procedures46 (seventy percent of
the TPS) and patient satisfaction (thirty percent of the TPS).47 CMS then
“converted each hospital’s TPS into a value-based incentive payment

	
  
professional fees that we already identified as labor-related, resulting in a
professional fees: Labor-related cost weight of 5.500 percent.
42. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7)(c)(5)(2013) (Hospital Value Based
Purchasing Program, wherein reductions to the base operating DRG for hospitals
increases to two percent in 2017); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q)(3)(C)(iii) (2013) (Hospital
Readmission Reduction Program, wherein reductions to the base operating DRG for
hospitals can increase to as much as three percent in 2015); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p)(1)
(2013) (Hospital-Acquired Conditions, which can decrease hospital Medicare revenue by
one percent starting in 2015); Lisa Rosenbaum, The Whole Ball Game–Overcoming the
Blind Spots in Health Care Reform, 368 N. ENGL. J. MED. 959 (2013) (“If we focus on
physicians and patients separately, we lose any sense of how their goals match up and
whether patients value care that the evidence indicates is necessary.”); Karen Kane, What
Does Quality Cost? Analyzing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s Value
Based Purchasing Provision and How It Could Affect the Delivery of Care by Hospitals,
14 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 69, 78-80 (2011); Michelle Nicole Diamond, Legal Triage for
Healthcare Reform, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 255, 272 (2011).
43. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,677 (May 10, 2013).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(7)(C) (2012).
45. Id.
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) and (for fiscal year 2013) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(ii)(for fiscal year 2014). These quality measures include (1) Acute
Myocardial Infarction (two measures); (2) Heart Failure (one measure); (3) Pneumonia
(two measures); (4) Healthcare-Associated Infections through the surgical care
improvement project (seven measures) which focuses on reducing surgical
complications; and (5) in 2015, efficiency measures “include measures of Medicare
spending per beneficiary.” Id.
47. See 78 Fed. Reg. 50,677 (May 10, 2013).
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percentage using a linear exchange function [1.8363054116 48 ] and then
converted the value-based incentive payment percentage into a per discharge
value-based incentive payment amount.” 49 For 2013 and 2014, CMS
regulations for the Hospital VBP Program include twelve clinical processes
of care measures, eight patient experience of care dimensions (identified
from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems (“HCAHPS”) survey), and three outcome measures.50 In Fiscal
Year 2015, Medicare regulations will add two new outcome measures and
an efficiency measure that tracks Medicare spending per beneficiary.51
Familiarizing oneself with these new measures and their descriptions,
however, is only the beginning. To fully understand how the Hospital VBP
Program will impact a hospital’s reimbursement in 2016, it is imperative to
pay careful attention to the achievement threshold and benchmark figures,
which do not include the numerical values that result when the performance
standards are calculated. The 2016 finalized performance standards for
outcome domain measures, with achievement thresholds and benchmarks,
include:
Measure ID

Measure Description

Achm’t 52 Benchmark53
(Percentages)

MORT-30-AMI

Acute Myocardial
Infarction (AMI) 30-day
mortality rate

0.847472

0.862371

MORT-30-HF

Heart Failure (HF)

0.881510

0.900315

	
  
48. See 78 Fed. Reg. 61,197, 61,200 (Oct. 3, 2013) (correcting the original number
published in the Federal Register on August 19, 2013 (1.8363321306) to read
“1.8363054116”).
49. See 78 Fed. Reg. 50,496 (Aug. 19, 2013).
50. See id. To summarize, the 2014 Hospital VBP Program quality measures
include: (1) Acute Myocardial Infarction (two measures); (2) Heart Failure (one
measure); (3) Pneumonia (two measures); (4) Healthcare-Associated Infections through
the surgical care improvement project (seven measures), which focuses on reducing
surgical complications; and (5) Patient experience of care dimensions. Id.
51. See id. In 2016, Medicare will again add new measures to the Hospital VBP
Program. Id.
52. The achievement threshold means the median (fiftieth percentile) of hospital
performance on a core measure during a baseline period for a particular fiscal year.
53. The benchmark means the arithmetic mean of the top decile of hospital
performance on a measure during a baseline period for a particular fiscal year. 42 C.F.R.
§ 412.160.
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30-day mortality rate
MORT-30-PN

Pneumonia (PN) 30-day
mortality rate

0.882651

0.904181

PSI-90

Complication/patient
safety for selected
indicators (composite)

0.622879

0.451792

The finalized clinical process of care, outcome and efficiency domain
measures for 2016, for example, include:
Measure ID

Measure Description

Achm’t
Benchmark
(Percentages)

IMM-2

Influenza Immunization

0.90607

0.98875

PN-6

Initial Antibiotic Selection 0.96552
For CAP in ImmunoCompetent Patient

1.00000

SCIP-Inf-2

Prophylactic Antibiotic
Selection for Surgical
Patients

0.99074

1.00000

SCIP-Inf-3

Prophylactic Antibiotics
Discontinued Within 24
Hours After Surgery End
Time

0.98086

1.00000

SCIP-Inf-9

Urinary Catheter Removed On Postoperative
Day 1 or Postoperative
Day 2

0.97059

1.00000

SCIP-Card-2

Surgery Patients on
Beta- Blocker Therapy
Prior to Arrival Who
Received a Beta-Blocker
During the Perioperative

0.97727

1.00000
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Period
SCIP-VTE-2

Surgery Patients Who
0.98225
Received Appropriate
Venous Thromboembolism
Prophylaxes Within 24
Hours Prior to Surgery to
24 Hours After Surgery

1.00000

CAUTI

Catheter-Associated
Urinary Tract Infection

0.801

0.000

CLABSI

Central Line-Associated
Blood Stream Infection

0.465

0.000

SSI

Surgical Site Infection
● Colon
● Abdominal
Hysterectomy

0.668
0.752

0.000
0.000

HCAHPS Survey Dimension

Floor

Achm’t
Benchmark
(Percentages)

Communication with Nurses

53.99

77.67

86.07

Communication with Doctors

57.01

80.40

88.56

Responsiveness of Hospital
Staff

38.21

64.71

79.76

Pain Management

48.96

70.18

78.16

Communication About Medicines

34.61

62.33

72.77

Hospital Cleanliness & Quietness

43.08

64.95

79.10

Discharge Information

61.36

84.70

90.39

Overall Rating of Hospital

34.95

69.32

83.97
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Although the 2014 Regulations provide examples that extend through
2019, the information set forth above is consistent with the CMS approach
that “is well understood by patient advocates, hospitals, and other
stakeholders because it was developed during a lengthy process that
involved extensive stakeholder input, and was based on a scoring
methodology [CMS] presented in a report to Congress.”54
D. Hospital RRP
The Hospital RRP penalizes hospitals for certain excess readmissions,
including acute myocardial infarction, heart failure and pneumonia. 55
Starting in October 2014, while Medicare will exclude planned
readmissions, the total amount for which a hospital may be penalized
increases to two percent (up from one percent in 2013).56 Moreover, in 2015
Medicare will introduce four new measures for inclusion in the Hospital
RRP: (1) coronary artery bypass grafts (“CABG”) surgery; (2) chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”); (3) percutaneous coronary
intervention (“PCI”); and (4) other vascular conditions.57
For 2014, the formula employed by CMS to calculate the readmissions
penalty, or readmission adjustment factor, is:
Aggregate payments for excess readmissions = [sum of base
operating DRG payments for AMI x (Excess Readmission Ratio
for AMI-1)] + [sum of base operating DRG payments for HF x
(Excess Readmission Ratio for HF-1)] + [sum of base operating
DRG payments for PN x (Excess Readmission Ratio for PN-1)] +
[sum of base operating DRG payments for COPD x (excess
readmission ratio for COPD-1)] + [sum of base operating
payments for THA/TKA x (excess readmission ratio for
THA/TKA -1)].
Aggregate payments for all discharges = sum of base operating
DRG payments for all discharges.
Ratio
=
1
–
(Aggregate
payments
for
excess
readmissions/Aggregate payments for all discharges.)58

	
  
54. Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and
the Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Proposed Fiscal Year
2014 Rates, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,616-17 (May 10, 2013) (Interim Rule).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q) (2012).
56. Id. at § 1395ww(q)(3)(C).
57. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,653. The regulations for 2015 may also include Total Hip
Arthroplasty (“THA”) and Total Knee Arthroplasty (“TKA”). 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,988.
58. Id. See also Readmissions Reduction Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-
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The Readmission Adjustment Factor for 2014 is the higher of the ratio or
0.9800, all of which is based on claims data from July 1, 2009 to June 30,
2012. 59 In response to the RRP, hospitals have focused considerable
attention toward discharge and post-discharge care, in some instances
informally extending a hospital stay beyond its clinical conclusion,60 or at
other times not admitting a return patient for “inpatient” status but rather
keeping the patient in “observation.”61 Because the program targets elderly
hospital patients, the debate over the RRP’s value continues.62
E. Medicare DSH
Starting in Fiscal Year 2014, hospitals that usually receive Medicare DSH
payments will receive these monies in two separate payments: (1) Twentyfive percent of the amount the hospital previously received under Medicare
DSH, and (2) “an additional payment for the DSH hospital’s proportion of
uncompensated care, determined as the product of three factors.”63 These
three factors, which now make up seventy-five percent of the Medicare DSH
funds to which a hospital may be entitled, include:
(1) 75% payment of the payments that would otherwise be made
[under the old DSH methodology] (2) 1 minus the percentage
change in the percent of individuals under the age of 65 who are
uninsured (minus 0.1 percentage points for FY 2014, and minus
0.2 percentage points for FY 2015 through FY 2017); and (3) a
hospital’s uncompensated care amount relative to the
uncompensated care amounts of all DSH hospitals expressed as a
percentage.64
II. MAKING SENSE OF THE FUTURE
The projected efficiency with which Medicare will operate under the 2014
regulations serves as a basis to justify the nature and complexity of
PPACA’s newfound annual regulations. Even those programs designed to
reallocate Medicare funding to hospitals operating at higher levels of

	
  
Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/Readmissions-Reduction-Program.html (last visited July 9,
2014).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q).
60. See 42 C.F.R. § 419.22(n) (defines services that support an inpatient admission
and Part A as appropriate, notwithstanding the length of stay).
61. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., HOSPITALS’ USE OF OBSERVATION STAYS
AND SHORT INPATIENT STAYS FOR MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES (July 29, 2013).
62. See generally Press, supra note 10.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(r).
64. 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,613.
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efficiency are estimated to reduce initial payments by as much as $1.1
billion.65 The early stages alone of this current reconfiguration are expected
to force a reduction of more than five percent for any particular hospital.66 If
such cutbacks are applied across the healthcare spectrum, the anticipated
reductions alone would result in a $30 billion cut. With hospital profit
margins facing a national crisis, it remains to be seen if hospitals can afford
this loss of revenue.67
If successful, this redistribution of Medicare funding among hospitals is
only the beginning of what may soon become a total reconfiguration of the
Medicare program. From its humble origins in 1965, when it cost
beneficiaries $3.00 per year for coverage under Part B,68 Medicare has
grown to become anything but modest when viewed in terms of its everevolving infrastructure, and it is far too early to predict the fate of programs
such as Hospital VBP or the RRP. Nevertheless, from its inception PPACA
has been structured to strive toward long-term goals,69 and while the Federal
Government believes that the effects of recent changes such as those
addressing the Hospital VBP Program will directly impact the improvement
of patient outcomes, safety, and the patient’s overall experience.70 This
same government, however, acknowledges that there is no concrete way to
“estimate these benefits in actual dollar and patient terms”71 because the
programs do not begin until the following fiscal year. Only time will tell if
modern healthcare’s recently added complexities will fortify America’s
healthcare structure or create a series of financial cracks to weaken the
foundations upon which it was built.

	
  
65. Id. at 50,507.
66. Id. This, of course, does not take into consideration reductions in revenue from
sequestration (2%), see 2 U.S.C. § 900(c)(2), as well as inpatient quality reporting (2%),
see 42 C.F.R. § 412.140, and outpatient quality reporting (2%), see 42 C.F.R. § 419.46.
Together these three additional items can raise reductions from five percent to eleven
percent.
67. See generally Mark G. Harrison & Cecilia C. Montalvo, The Financial Health of
California Hospitals: A Looming Crisis, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 120 (Jan. 2002); Declining
Operating Margins Show U.S. Hospitals Still Face Challenges, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.
(Feb. 1, 2006), available at http://www.allbusiness.com/health-care-social\assistance/864684-1.html.
68. See Marian E. Gornick, et al., Thirty Years of Medicare: Impact on the Covered
Population, 18:2 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 183 (1996).
69. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2642 (2012) (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).
70. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 50,677.
71. 78 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (May 10, 2013).

